Political scientists frequently use qualitative evidence to support or evaluate the empirical applicability of formal models. Despite this widespread practice, neither the qualitative methods literature nor research on empirically evaluating formal models systematically address the topic. This article makes three contributions to bridge this gap. First, it demonstrates that formal models and qualitative evidence are indeed frequently combined in current research. Second, it shows how process tracing can be as important a tool for empirically assessing models as statistical testing, because models and process tracing share a common focus on understanding causal mechanisms. Lastly, it provides new guidelines for using process tracing that focus on issues specific to the modeling enterprise, illustrated with examples from recent research. * We thank
Introduction
Since the introduction of formal models into political science, their relationship with the rest of the discipline has provoked vigorous discussion. Early debates about whether formalization or rational choice approaches contribute to our understanding of politics have largely given way to more applied discussions about the appropriate relationship between formal theories and empirical research.
1 Yet these discussions have centered on how (or even whether) formal models should be tested with statistical methods, providing little guidance for scholars interested in assessing formal theories with qualitative evidence.
Likewise, although the literature on qualitative methods has seen a strong resurgence of activity in recent years, it does not address the particular issues that arise when seeking to use qualitative methods to evaluate formal theories.
This methodological gap is perplexing, because in practice articles introducing a new formal model frequently include qualitative evidence. We surveyed all such articles published from 2006 to 2013 on topics in international relations and comparative politics from a set of prominent journals and found that qualitative evidence appeared in over half the articles that empirically assessed the model. Furthermore, recent critiques of prominent models of audience costs and of regime change have sparked vigorous debates about core arguments in these subfields.
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Yet despite its common use, formal theorists often dismiss the value of qualitative evidence. Coming from the other direction, scholars using qualitative evidence to evaluate existing formal models do not express these qualms, but modelers often question the conclusions drawn by these studies. The lack of agreed-upon standards can lead scholars 1 For examples of the former, Green and Shapiro (1994) and Shepsle (1995) provide influential early statements. Little and Pepinsky (2016) and Svolik (forthcoming) revisit the topic. For examples of the latter, see Morton (1999) , Clarke and Primo (2012) , and Granato et al. (2012) . 2 We focus on international relations and comparative politics because qualitative evidence has been far less prominent in formal theoretical research on American politics.
from different methodological backgrounds to talk past each other, hindering scientific
progress. The applied formal modeling enterprise is now at an unsatisfying middle ground whereby qualitative evidence is routinely used to convince readers of the value of a model, yet the evidence is not presented or evaluated rigorously because it is qualitative.
The frequency with which scholars from diverse methodological backgrounds use qualitative evidence to evaluate formal models, along with a lack of clear methodological guidance, suggests two options: develop better standards or abandon the practice. We argue for developing better standards. In particular, formal models and the increasingly prominent qualitative method known as process tracing share an under-recognized affinity-a focus on causal mechanisms-that makes process tracing a valuable tool for the empirical investigation of formal models. Qualitative evidence that strongly supports or contradicts a model's causal processes can help to either strengthen or to weaken the model's claims to empirical applicability. Such process tracing can be as convincing as statistical tests.
A sharp need exists for systematic standards on using process tracing to evaluate formal models. In this article, we take a first step toward such standards, focusing on issues that are unique to or are particularly important for the modeling endeavor rather than surveying process tracing in general. We address (1) how to use process tracing to evaluate the causal mechanisms embodied in a formal model, (2) what types of evidence to collect to conduct process tracing, and (3) how to select cases. Although we draw from existing scholarship on process tracing, formal models raise specific concerns including how to (or even whether) to test a model's assumptions and how to assess actors' beliefs. Furthermore, the guidelines provided improve upon the somewhat ad hoc approaches used at present for evaluating models. By including examples in which qualitative evidence is intended to validate a model as well as examples in which the evidence challenges a formal model, we hope to engage scholars from diverse backgrounds to help bridge the gap between two
closely related yet surprisingly disconnected research traditions.
In order to discuss how to evaluate models, we must first specify what this means. Some scholars have implied that formal models have no value unless they can be and have been empirically tested (Hill 2005) . Others have argued that the notion of empirically testing theoretical models misunderstands both formal theory and empirical research (Clarke and Primo 2012) . We take a middle ground that we believe reflects the consensus view of most applied modelers, but which may require some explanation for other scholars. In particular,
we do not believe it is possible to test whether a model is true or correct in the same way that one can test a statistical hypothesis. All models are simplifications and therefore are false in the strictest sense. However, political scientists are frequently interested in evaluating whether a particular model serves a useful guide to understanding a specific empirical setting. 
Formal Models and Qualitative Evidence: Problems with Current Practice
The current use of qualitative evidence and formal models highlights two interrelated problems. First, although qualitative evidence often accompanies the introduction of new models, this is done with little methodological self-consciousness. Second, a gap exists in the methods literature. With few exceptions, the literatures on the empirical testing of formal models and qualitative methods do not address how to evaluate formal models using qualitative evidence.
Contradictions in Current Practice
To understand current practice, we surveyed six prominent political science journals and identified all articles with a formal model published between 2006 and 2013. 4 Of the 182 such articles that addressed topics in international relations or comparative politics, 70 4 The Appendix provides additional details on this survey, and an accompanying document lists all 182 modeling articles in the survey. This widespread use of qualitative evidence has two implications. First, since models are already frequently presented in conjunction with qualitative evidence, a need exists for more explicit standards against which to evaluate using such evidence. Second, the importance of qualitative evidence in the formal modeling enterprise suggests scholars with skills in qualitative research should be encouraged to systematically evaluate evidence offered for formal theories and to gather new evidence to evaluate these theories. Recent qualitative challenges to influential formal models, discussed below, represent an important step in this direction despite the counter-criticisms they have attracted.
Unfortunately, scholars introducing a formal model often disparage their own qualitative evidence even after devoting considerable thought to this evidence. For example, in an article discussing political barriers to industrialization, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) devote four journal pages to country case studies that contain extensive evidence these cases are consistent with their model. Yet they state their "interpretations are necessarily speculative and more conclusive evidence requires proper statistical testing of the ideas we develop here" (125). Similarly, Slantchev (2011) opens a chapter-long analysis of the expansion of the Korean War by saying, "I remain skeptical about the extent to which we should trust either supporting or disconfirming evidence" (192) .
Certainly, these models constitute important theoretical advances regardless of how well 5 Prominent examples from recent years include Kydd (2005) , Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a) , Slantchev (2011) , Gailmard and Patty (2012), and Gingerich (2013) . they explain particular cases. Additionally, one might argue that these case studies are only intended as illustrations to make the models more accessible to non-technical readers.
However, political scientists often link their models with historical events because they hope readers will find the empirical connection plausible and meaningful. Indeed, after Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) 
Shortcomings of Existing Standards
Little methodological guidance exists for combining qualitative evidence and formal models. Discussions of empirically testing formal models may mention case studies in passing, but typically characterize them as merely a source of ideas after which formalization and quantitative testing can begin (e.g., Morton 1999, 133-4; Granato and Scioli 2004) . A recent book-length challenge to the very premise of testing models has "little to say directly about qualitative research . . . because the conversation in political science in recent years has revolved around formal models and statistical models" (Clarke and Primo 2012, 18) . The neglect has been mutual. The terms "game theory" and "formal theory" appear nowhere in the widely-used qualitative methods handbook Rethinking Social Inquiry (Brady and Collier 2010) , nor in two recent book-length treatments of case study methods (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Rohlfing 2012) . The topic receives only passing mention in George and Bennett's (2005) influential guide to case study methodology (e.g., 34-5), Goertz and Mahoney's (2012) study of the "two cultures" of quantitative and qualitative research (e.g., 106), and Bennett and Checkel's (2014) guide to process tracing.
A decade-and-a-half after its launch, the Analytic Narratives project remains the most prominent attempt to combine formal models and qualitative research (Bates et al. 1998). 6 Although ideas from this project remain important, more attention to integrating models and qualitative evidence is needed. First, the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of thinking on qualitative methods, producing important insights relevant for evaluating formal theories. Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, Bates et al. (1998) sought to show how formal and non-formal rational choice theories could contribute to the idiographic tradition by "account[ing] for particular events or outcomes" (10). Their concern with using models to understand particular cases differs from our broader goal of using qualitative evidence to evaluate existing evaluate models that aspire to greater generality. Our literature review suggests this objective is far more common than an analytic narrative's goal of using a model to elucidate a single case. Among the articles we reviewed, only Nalepa (2010) claimed to follow the analytic narratives template-and this article includes three country case studies. 
The Distinct Advantages of Process Tracing
The broad goal of empirically evaluating a model is often conflated with using statistics to evaluate a model's covariational predictions (e.g., Morton 1999; Granato et al. 2012 ).
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6 Levi (2004) and Greif (2006) discuss and develop the analytic narratives methodology further. Buthe (2002) discusses how to effectively use historical narratives to evaluate models, broadly construed, but does not address the specific challenges of evaluating formal theories. Laitin (2002 Laitin ( , 2003 argues for the complementarity of qualitative, quantitative, and formal approaches. Recent work by Kuehn (2013) and Goemans and Spaniel (2015) also advocate the combination of process tracing and formal models. We build upon these contemporaneous contributions by comprehensively marrying formal models with a broad spectrum of best-practice process tracing methods and by thoroughly summarizing existing practice. 7 See also Lorentzen and Scoggins (2015) , although they do not use the term. 8 The qualitative analogue of this is cross-case comparisons, which can provide some basis to evaluate such predictions where a large sample is unavailable. The literature on this However, despite the importance of comparative statics predictions, a model is not simply a claim about the relationship between an X and a Y. Instead, a model embodies claims about a causal process by which X influences Y. This corresponds directly with the goals of process tracing, which involves examining "intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest" (Bennett and Checkel 2014: 6) . That is, rather than trying to assess whether or not changes in X produce changes in Y, the goal is to evaluate a particular mechanism linking the two. The analyst uses many facts from a case, sometimes called "causal process observations," to evaluate the plausibility of a particular causal mechanism (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004) .
Modeling and process tracing are also closely related in the kind of thinking they require.
Using process tracing requires a scholar to "clarify as much as possible . . . (2010) and Slater and Ziblatt (2013) provide more recent statements that could easily translate to testing formal models, so we will not discuss this approach here. Process tracing also offers several practical advantages for evaluating models, which the following sections discuss in detail. Quite often, off-the-shelf datasets do not adequately measure key parameters and choice variables. Even more rarely do they provide insight into actors' perceptions of their strategic setting. A close examination of a smaller number of cases can be preferable to a large-N test with more questionable measures (see Section 5). Furthermore, especially in models with country-level implications, the number of cases that correspond to the scope conditions of the formal model might be small enough to make conventional statistical tests infeasible (see Section 6). Finally, if a model falls short in a particular case, then the kind of information provided by detailed process tracing plays a crucial role in generating new formal models (Section 7).
Our intent here is not to advocate abandoning statistical tests in favor of process tracing.
The value-added of quantitative evaluation is well-known. Our point is simply that process tracing has distinct strengths for evaluating formal models that make it just as important for assessing formal models as statistical tests.
However, using process tracing to evaluate formal models raises particular challenges that the qualitative methods literature does not consider. The remainder of this article discusses characteristics that distinguish convincing process tracing evaluations of formal models from unconvincing ones. We illustrate these features with examples from research that introduces a new model and provides qualitative evidence to support it, as well as from research that assesses existing formal models. We focus on three key areas in qualitative methods research: how to evaluate mechanisms, how to gather evidence, and which cases to select. Table 1 summarizes the standards. (2006a) . Their core model assumes that all redistribution occurs through a flat tax, whose proceeds are handed out equally to all members of society. It also assumes that in a democracy, this tax rate will be determined through a one-person-one-vote system. By contrast, it implies that the wealthy will prefer autocracy to democracy and the poor will prefer the opposite, and that given the opportunity, each group may mobilize politically to achieve its desired regime. These two assumptions and two implications can each be evaluated using process tracing. Our confidence in the empirical value of any model depends significantly in our evaluation of assumptions like these even though they cannot be statistically tested. Below, we first discuss how to use process tracing to evaluate a model's assumptions and implications, and then discuss the importance of comparing the model's mechanisms to alternative explanations. These topics constitute the core elements of using process tracing to evaluate formal models, assuming the researcher has already chosen cases and collected data (discussed later in the article).
9 By contrast, another implication of this model is that countries with high income inequality should be less likely to democratize. This kind of implication about outcomes is natural to test statistically.
Evaluating Assumptions About the Causal Process
Evaluating a model's assumptions is a particularly contentious issue. At one extreme, Milton Friedman (1966 [1953 : 14) argues assumptions should never be evaluated because they are not meant to be accurate descriptions of reality. Instead, Friedman asserts that we should restrict attention solely to a model's predictions. But this position does not help to adjudicate between different models that explain the same set of facts, nor does it provide guidance for revising models with weak predictive power. At the other extreme, Bates et al. (1998: 14) present as a key criterion of a good analytic narrative that "the assumptions fit the facts." Yet whether an assumption fits the facts is also a poor standard. All models and indeed all theories inherently simplify and therefore contain assumptions that do not exactly "fit the facts," so this standard provides an easy target for unproductive critiques. Although it is impossible to draw a bright line between satisfactory and unsatisfactory assumptions, we propose two criteria that establish a pragmatic middle ground. With regard to critiquing a model's assumptions, it is easier to evaluate the impact of changing an assumption if two competing formal models differ only on that one assumption. Although this is rarely the case, we can still make a more subjective judgment of whether a particular change in assumptions would likely meaningfully change the conclusions. Consider, for example, recent evaluations of audience cost models with qualitative evidence. This family of models builds on Fearon (1994 Fearon ( , 1997 , who presented a model of international disputes in which "the side with a stronger domestic audience (e.g., a democracy) is always less likely to back down" (1994: 577). Audience costs, or the cost a leader would pay for backing down in a dispute, more rapidly lock democratic leaders into a stated position. Snyder and Borghard (2011) challenge this theory in part because they disagree with the key assumption that "publics care a great deal about consistency between threats and deeds, independent of their preferences on policy substance" (439), among others.
Snyder and Borghard therefore examine crises in which democratic leaders made threats and failed to carry them out. Although they only found one case in which domestic audiences imposed no costs on the leader, they provide considerable evidence against the theory even in the apparently confirmatory cases: domestic audiences punished leaders only when those audiences were already pro-war. This contrasts with the model's assumption that audiences will punish leaders primarily for failing to back their threats up.
Of course, proponents of audience costs can counter that this evidence does not fully rule out the counterfactual implied by the model: those leaders had weaker public support after making these threats and then backing down than if they had never made the threats in the first place (Fearon 2013) . Nonetheless, the lack of evidence for this effect suggests the tradeoff assumed in the formal model is not highly relevant in the cases examined.
Regardless of one's assessment of Snyder and Borghard's evidence, 13 their critique satisfies our standard for how to assess an assumption. The assumption that audiences want their leaders to back up threats independently of whether they actually believe the prize is worth fighting for is not merely a simplification, but instead is fundamental to the theoretical logic of this family of models. If this assumption is rarely empirically relevant or its effect is negligible in practice, then audience cost models offer little additional explanatory leverage relative to a simpler theory in which democratic leaders largely follow the electorate's preferences. 13 For a vigorous discussion of this article and the closely related Trachtenberg (2012a), see Schultz (2012) , Slantchev (2012) , Trachtenberg (2012b) , and other symposium articles in the same issue of Security Studies. 
Evaluating Observable Implications About the Causal Process

Examining Alternative Explanations
Whether validating or challenging a model, process tracing should also address alternative hypotheses. Bennett (2010) places this consideration at the heart of the method: "Process tracing involves the examination of 'diagnostic' pieces of evidence within a case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses . . . What matters is not the amount of evidence, but its contribution to adjudicating among alternative hypotheses" (208-9).
For example, in a study on trust in international relations, Kydd (2005) formalizes Robert Jervis's well-known spiral model. One important implication of the formalization is that spirals of "unjustified mistrust"-circumstances in which both states are security-seekers that nevertheless view each other as expansionist and threatening-should be quite rare. Frequently, however, political scientists introducing a new model often provide evidence consistent with their own explanation but do not consider existing alternative hypotheses.
14 Lorentzen (2014) provides another example.
Additionally, even when scholars do consider alternative explanations, they often only address rival formal models. For instance, Miller and Schofield (2003) set their explanation for the gradual shift in American party alignments over the past century against formal models they interpret as implying "chaos" (constantly changing or unpredictable policy positions) or "convergence" (policies fixed at the median voter), but do not address any competing non-formalized explanations for this shift.
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Evaluating alternative explanations is also vital when challenging formal models. Judging a model against the ideal of perfect consistency with all available facts rather than against a specific alternative explanation can result in unconstructive critiques of oversimplified assumptions, such as appeared in Elster's (2000) critique of Analytic Narratives. This concern may even raise questions about more pertinent critiques. Schultz (2012) and Slantchev (2012) both argue the arguments against audience costs theories made in Trachtenberg (2012a) and Snyder and Borghard (2011) are weakened because they do not explicitly delineate an internally consistent alternative explanation, although Trachtenberg (2012b) rejects this criticism.
Gathering Evidence to Evaluate a Model's Mechanisms
Process tracing both permits and requires more attention to gathering evidence than is generally possible in statistical analyses. This has two implications. First, key variables should be operationalized and measured carefully and precisely. Second, scholars should use a broader range of evidence, such as transcript evidence (the public or private communications of actors directly involved in the case).
Carefully Measuring Key Variables
Properly measured variables are a necessary foundation for any convincing empirical analysis. Models, especially in international relations, frequently encompass difficult-tomeasure concepts such as actors' perceptions of the distribution of power. It may be preferable to study covariational patterns among a small number of personally measured cases rather than to use an off-the-shelf measure that does not adequately measure the underlying concept-even if the latter facilitates a larger sample. Ideally, these variables should be measured in multiple ways to assess whether different measures produce divergent findings. If they do, then it is important to defend why one measure should be preferred over others. Although this advice applies for any case study, researchers presenting qualitative support for their own models rarely consider multiple measures. 
Using Transcript Evidence to Assess Actors' Beliefs
Effective process tracing also requires and facilitates using a broader range of evidence than is typical of statistical analyses. In particular, when treated with appropriate caution,
transcript evidence-what decision-makers in the case and those around them actually said or wrote-can help assess whether actors appeared to perceive key tradeoffs from the formal model and their perceptions of which undesirable outcomes they anticipated and took steps to avoid.
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For example, Goemans and Fey (2009) leverage transcript evidence when using process tracing to evaluate a model that explains risky behavior by national leaders in international conflicts. Their model suggests leaders with weak domestic support will take military actions that decrease the overall probability of winning a war if those actions simultaneously increase the odds their country will decisively win the war-the only outcome in which the tenuously supported leaders will stay in power. Here, the key intervening variable is how leaders perceive their actions will affect variance in the war's outcome. Empirically, they examine Germany's decision in January 1917 to return to unrestricted submarine warfare. Consistent with the model's implications, Goemans and 16 In other words, what were their beliefs about outcomes off the equilibrium path? Weingast (1996) provides a lengthier discussion of how scrutinizing off-the-equilibrium path behavior in game theoretic models can inform historical analysis.
Fey provide evidence from contemporary speeches, reports, and armistice negotiations that German leaders risked this gamble because without additional action Germany would not have been able to achieve a deal favorable enough for its leaders to keep their jobs-even though this gamble lowered Germany's expected settlement terms by raising the likelihood the U.S. would enter the war.
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Of course, individuals often have incentives to lie to justify their actions. This highlights the importance of addressing possible biases when presenting transcript evidence-which the formal model may provide insight into. It would go too far to treat direct statements from political actors as necessary evidence for a particular interpretation of their actions. Gartzke and Lupu (2012) argue that critics of audience cost theory make this mistake by treating the lack of instances in which political leaders admit they were trying to create audience costs as evidence against the theory. It may not be wise for political leaders to admit, even after the fact, that they were trying to make war over an issue unavoidable. Or they may simply not be introspective enough to write down their thoughts afterwards. Overall, transcript evidence offers a unique opportunity to assess actors' beliefs. The potential pitfalls of transcript evidence indicates that researchers should carefully interpret this evidence and acknowledge that these interpretations are subject to debate. But these pitfalls do not mean that such evidence should be disregarded and cannot be used (contra Bates et al. 1998, 698 and Beck 2010) . Furthermore, the difficulty of incorporating such evidence into a statistical framework highlights another distinct advantage of qualitative tests.
Selecting Cases to Isolate the Model's Mechanisms
The above discussion presumes the analyst has chosen cases for which we should expect a model's assumptions and implications to find support. However, no model will provide insight into all cases. Qualitative methodologists have made notable progress in the past decade by articulating different ways cases can be selected and by explaining how particular case selection procedures serve different research goals. 18 However, distinct issues arise when evaluating formal models, leading us to make two recommendations for selecting cases. First, the case should match the model's assumptions as closely as possible.
Second, and contrary to standard statistical practices, sampling on particular values of the main independent and/or dependent variables may be more likely to distinguish the model from alternatives and to yield useful transcript evidence.
First, recommending that cases selected should match the model's assumptions as closely as possible resembles the goal of choosing cases that fit the model's scope conditions.
Although no case will perfectly match the precise technical setup of the model-nor will a bright line distinguish cases that are conclusively in or out of scope-a model should be more likely to correspond with empirical cases for which the model's assumptions match more closely. This provides an important practical advantage of process tracing. For many important theories and models, the total number of cases meeting this criterion will often yield low-powered statistical tests. This is particularly true for the country-level theories that are often the focus of comparative politics and international relations research.
18 Lieberman (2005) , Seawright and Gerring (2008) , and Fearon and Laitin (2008) discuss how to select cases from a large dataset after an initial statistical analysis is complete. Bennett and Elman (2006) survey earlier developments in this literature. Second, sampling on particular values of the independent and/or dependent variables is often the best strategy for assessing whether a model's mechanisms help to explain known outcomes (Collier and Mahoney 1996) , 19 in contrast to case selection principles derived from statistical research (Geddes 1990) . A model's predictions may only be distinguished from prominent alternative explanations for certain values of the independent variable(s).
Similarly, actors may only be likely to produce transcript evidence relevant for distinguishing the model from alternatives when certain conditions are present. Goemans and Fey's (2009: 35) analysis of Germany's strategy in the final years of the First World War illustrates this approach. As discussed, they use transcript evidence to show that the logic of their model explains the outcome of risky escalation to unrestricted submarine warfare better than alternative explanations assuming incomplete information.
In particular, they summarize transcript evidence in which German leaders expressed fears 19 Gerring (2007) suggests that cases of this type be referred to as "pathway" cases and offers additional useful suggestions on their selection and usage. This approach is related to but distinct from Eckstein's (1975) Similarly, Dunning's (2008) model discussed earlier implies greater resource wealth may tend to preserve rather than weaken democracy for a particular value of a conditioning factor: non-resource income is distributed very unequally. Examining the case of Venezuela, an oil-rich country with high non-resource inequality, he finds considerable evidence that the association predicted by the model is generated by the mechanism in the model. But suppose he had instead analyzed a country with no resource wealth, or a country with resource wealth but a very even income distribution. These standards for case selection are useful both when a researcher is trying to provide initial empirical support for a model and when the goal is to challenge an established model. When developing a model, finding strong evidence for the model's explanatory power in one or a few cases is sufficient to make the argument that it warrants further empirical investigation. Similarly, when the research goal is to evaluate an existing model, attention should be focused on cases where its processes should be most apparent because the model's proponents may rightfully dismiss contrary evidence from less pertinent cases.
Both recent challenges to audience costs models follow this principle. Snyder and Borghard (2011: 444) survey all post-1945 international crises involving the United States, and then focus on cases in which a democratic leader made a public threat and domestic public opinion was mobilized around the issue. Democratic leaders' anticipation of audience costs should also affect their escalation decision even if they do not make such threats, but it would presumably be more difficult to find evidence of these costs. Trachtenberg (2012a) instead restricts attention to great power crises that involve a democracy and do not end in war. Both studies aim to evaluate the model in a best-case scenario by looking for cases that fit the scope conditions of the model as closely as possible, minimize confounding factors, and in which the mechanisms of the model should be isolated from alternative explanations.
Related, as discussed, examine every regime transition worldwide from 1980 to 2000 to assess redistributive regime transition models. These theories have implications for politically stable regimes as well, but there are two good reasons to focus on transitions. First, a society at the crux of transition is most likely to produce transcript evidence useful for assessing how important are inequality-driven social tensions. Second, the originators of these models advance general claims: Boix (2003) aims to offer "a theory of political transitions and regime choice" (10) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a) offer a "framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy" (front matter). Such claims of broad applicability has led these models to be so influential in our thinking. But by the same token, failure to find evidence of the models' mechanisms in nearly every recent transition case suggests either that their scope is more sharply delimited than initially claimed, or that the strategic factors and tradeoffs they highlight are considerably smaller in magnitude than had been thought. (Acemoglu et al. 2013 , Soifer 2013 . The sum of this evidence strongly supports the conclusion that redistributional pressure is not a central factor to analyze for understanding modern regime changes.
What should be done if process tracing casts doubt on the empirical relevance of a model?
The next step is to work toward a new theory that will serve as a better guide to understanding the particular context. Regardless of whether one plans to formalize the theory, further progress will require careful thought about which assumptions were empirically irrelevant in the rejected model and what alternative assumptions might serve
better. This will usually be founded in qualitative case knowledge, which highlights another distinct advantage of process tracing research. For instance, one could take Slater, Smith, and Nair's (2014) findings and explore the implications of models with an independent military, or in which the total amount of possible redistribution is greatly circumscribed. Or one could build off Haggard and Kaufmann's (2012) observation that autocrats may build support through populist redistributive strategies.
By contrast, statistical findings provide little guidance for future theorizing. Suppose one does not accept that qualitative evidence can meaningfully cast empirical doubt on a model, but accepts Acemoglu et al.'s (2013) conclusion that inequality has "no robust causal relationship" with regime transitions in any methodologically sound statistical analysis.
Where should one go next? Qualitative research, most likely including some form of process tracing, will still be required in order to lay foundations for a better theory.
As a final point about the role of models in the larger social science enterprise, models have many uses and even "wrong" models can be valuable in moving our thinking forward.
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The central issues raised by redistributive transition models and some of the techniques used to analyze them will play an important part in subsequent theories developed to explain political transitions (Boix 2013) and even other topics. 21 Moreover, the difficulty of conclusively evaluating the empirical relevance of a particular model and the value a model can have even if it falls short empirically demonstrate why we should reject the position that formal theories should not be published for wider consideration until they have been empirically tested. 22 The highly informative debates about redistributive causes of regime transitions and about audience costs simply would not have been possible without the parsimonious and clear formal frameworks provided by these foundational formal models.
20 Powell (1999: 23-39) and Clarke and Primo (2012) discuss these points more thoroughly. 21 For instance, the role of natural resources in preventing civil wars (Paine 2016) .
22 Hill (2005) , for instance, asserts that this view was near-universal among reviewers for the American Journal of Political Science for at least a period of time.
Conclusion
Although there has been extensive discussion of when and how to link formal theories and statistical evidence, the role of qualitative evidence in evaluating formal theories has been largely neglected. Nevertheless, as we have demonstrated, using qualitative evidence to validate formal models is actually common practice among formal theorists-particularly in international relations and comparative politics-and qualitative scholars are also becoming more actively engaged in evaluating formal models. This is not accidental, but results from the focus that case studies, especially those using process tracing, share with game-theoretic models on understanding causal mechanisms. Yet rather than capitalize on this affinity, scholars versed in formal theory are often vague about or explicitly denigrate inferences drawn from qualitative evidence, leaving readers with no clear standard by which to judge the evidence provided. Relatedly, many formal theorists appear to be largely unaware of the substantial body of recent research refining and advancing techniques for qualitative analysis. On the other side, the qualitative methods literature pays almost no attention to the specific concerns that arise with empirically assessing formal models using case studies. Modelers and qualitative scholars often seem to talk past each other for the simple reason that criteria for empirical validation remain unclear.
This disconnect between formal models and current qualitative research is unfortunate.
Both approaches share a common concern with mechanisms underlying causal relationships, and would benefit from greater integration in the collective effort to understand political phenomena. Towards this end, we have offered a new set of practical standards for using process tracing to evaluate formal models. These standards apply both to formal modelers aiming to convince a broader audience that a new model has empirical purchase in substantively important settings, and to scholars who seek to evaluate the empirical value of a model. This article represents one step in bridging the gap between two vibrant but often disconnected intellectual communities.
